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2019 of the Kiva crowdfunding platform. The drivers and enablers of the collaboration between formally registered firms (partners micro finances) 
and informal firms (unregistered firms - borrowers) in the context of the crowdfunding digital platform are studied. The results state a negative 
relationship between the lender’s propensity to make loans and the informal firm’s percentage borrowed. However, if the borrower receives a trust-
worthy partner (micro-finance), the borrower’s negative impact decreases. Moreover, the lender’s propensity to make loans lesser in projects of the 
tertiary sector. The study contributes to the entrepreneurship theory to understand the mechanism to legitimization the informal firm through 
collaboration with formal firms in the digital platforms.
Keywords Digital transformation, a crowdfunding platform, partner, collaborate, profit, social fi nance, signal, signaling th eory, information  
asymmetry.
Submitted: August 30th, 2020 / Approved: December 15th, 2020
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://jotmi.org)
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
1. Introduction
The increasing Internet access is transforming the way to do business 
globally. The incursion of technology-based companies containing 
digital platforms disrupts the service industries as media, education, 
finance, and health. This disruption starts with the less sophisticated 
customer segments and accelerates rapidly toward the more advan-
ced customer segments (Cennamo, 2019). Likewise, new companies 
applying unique business models based on digital platforms are being 
created. These technology companies connect suppliers and custo-
mers directly at a low cost (including low labor costs) and get a high 
level of satisfaction for suppliers and customers. Businesses based on 
technology platforms are overgrowing in emerging economies, espe-
cially in Latin America, applying total solutions strategies for custo-
mers, incorporating new and valuable complementary services, and 
developing a sharing economy (Monteiro et al., 2018). 
Although business platforms are growing and generating value for 
users, they are not exempt from criticism as the lack of institutional 
legitimacy of companies operating on digital platforms, such as the 
lack of license to offer services, which is why they are qualified un-
registered firms. Even so, these companies gain good acceptance by 
their users. While there are contexts of competition between formal 
and informal technology-based firms, there are other scenarios whe-
re both firms collaborate in the called “inclusive businesses.” Formal 
companies use informal platform companies as part of their produc-
tion process, generating temporary jobs offered in the so-called gig 
economy (Duggan et al., 2019). Likewise, informal firms collaborate 
with legal firms to distribute their products to customers, especially 
at the pyramid base. These informal platform enterprises use their 
broad support in social networks, especially at the bottom of the pyra-
mid, to offer various formal enterprises (Tate et al., 2019).
The crowdfunding platforms are not entirely clear within the digital 
platforms, whether they belong to the formal financial sector or the 
informal one. These have not been explicitly sanctioned or considered 
illegal but are preferably supported especially by the Chinese autho-
rities as an alternative way to informal financing that can lead to fi-
nancial instability in the system, a sample of which is the approval in 
late 2014 of a regulation based on in shares (Funk, 2019). Moreover, 
the crowdfunding platforms allow collaboration between formal and 
informal firms to develop new businesses (Schwittay, 2019). 
Although the strategic competition between formal and informal en-
terprises has been a topic in several studies, finding positive and nega-
tive relationships (Heredia et al., 2019). However, there is a gap in the 
management literature related to understanding the cooperation rela-
tionship between formal and informal enterprises and how it affects 
funding success. The phenomenon has been accelerated using digital 
platforms resulting from the COVID 19 pandemic. Indeed, most for-
mal companies are increasing digital platforms’ use to provide a bet-
ter service experience to their customers, seek new strategic partners 
and improve their performance in this digital environment (Heredia 
et al., 2020). This phenomenon occurs in the Kiva crowdfunding 
platform, which collaborates between formal and informal compa-
nies. Thus, the study aims to analyze the success factor in financing 
projects using the signaling theory. It allows hypothesizing that the 
interaction between formal and informal firms can generate collabo-
ration instead of competition and thus mutually benefit. It is observed 
by reducing the negative impact of the low perceived need and low 
trust of the lender on the percentage that the loan managed to be 
financed by the informal firm.
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Kiva, a popular crowdfunding platform, connects people who need 
funding for their project, whether social, humanitarian or entrepre-
neurship, profit, with people who want to allow borrowers around 
the world. Kiva is a platform that permits that entrepreneurs and 
others in financial need can gain access to funding through relatively 
small contributions from a relatively large number of individuals and 
circumventing standard financial intermediaries (Schwienbacher & 
Larralde, 2012).
The study data are collected by the webpage Kiva Tools, which con-
tains files with information about the credits, characteristics of the 
partners, and borrowers currently on the Kiva website. Additionally, 
it is included the logarithm of popularity as a proxy variable for the 
lenders’ characteristics to have the interaction of all the actors: len-
ders, borrowers (informal firms), and partners (formal microfinance 
firms). A multivariate analysis using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
technique is built, and it includes variables based on the published 
works related to the determinants of funding success across all plat-
form types (e.g., Moleskis et al., 2018). Some of these variables are the 
characteristics of the loan like rating risk, economic and social value, 
the number of borrowers and competition among projects, type of 
project:  entrepreneurial or social project, as well as the characteris-
tics of the borrower, such as gender, geography, network, and social 
capital (e.g., Shier & Handy).  
In sum, this study analyzes the collaboration between formal (part-
ners microfinance) and informal companies (borrowers) and its 
effects on the relation of lenders and borrowers (informal firms), 
using the case of the Kiva crowdfunding platform. Including the loan 
analyses (if it belongs to the tertiary sector or not) on this collabora-
tion. To respond to the research question: What conditions propend 
collaboration between formal and informal firms in industries with 
disruption in digital transformation as the crowdfunding platforms? 
The next sections include the theoretical framework and hypothesis, 
methodology and data, results, conclusions, and implications.
2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis
The lenders lend without receiving any interest in the risk of losing 
their money, so they donate the opportunity cost of the interest. They 
donate because the economic capacity and inclination to give are 
enough (Schlegelmilch et al., 1997). This behavior is also affected by 
demographic factors such as age, religious beliefs, gender, and ethni-
city (e.g., Shier & Handy, 2012). Another perspective explains that the 
people donate because they expect to receive material or immaterial 
benefits in return for their donations, including the effect of a warm 
glow, feelings of higher self-esteem, public recognition, or relief from 
guilt (Diamond & Kashyap, 1997). Many studies about charity ack-
nowledge that the internet is a powerful way to sensitize people to 
help those in need and solicit help. Kiva is a platform that allows the 
encounter between people who need support and opportunity and 
others who can support them worldwide.
Moreover, Kiva is an easy way for all participating agents to win. 
The underprivileged borrowers get the necessary funds to start their 
projects, whether profit or not. The lenders can help without thin-
king about the transaction costs because Kiva eliminates them by not 
charging fees and maintains an easy process for (re) investing that 
creates efficiency. Like microfinance institutions (MFIs), some part-
ners benefit from having more clients because they have more loans 
in their portfolios and perceive social responsibility benefits. Finally, 
both lenders and partners benefit from the social reputation that can 
enjoy by the publicity and social networks.
This study proposes that in Kiva, when an informal company (bo-
rrower) is found with a formal company (partner), unlike if it finds 
with another informal one (characteristic of the loan), a type of colla-
boration between them is generated, thus obtaining a mutual benefit 
because the lenders of Kiva have both prosocial and economics moti-
vations. The lenders act for their desire to help other people, but they 
care about the loan’s repayment and its efficient use. In this way, they 
also ensure that more people can get the same opportunity to obtain 
financing to start their projects. 
2.1 Information asymmetry and signaling
In crowdfunding, information asymmetry is presented because the len-
ders do not have the same information as borrowers if they think or pay 
their requests. Furthermore, two broad types of information asymme-
try can be present in crowdfunding as information about quality and 
intent. The intention is critical because it shows the agent’s behavior, 
and intentions examine the use of incentives as mechanisms for redu-
cing potential moral hazards that result from an individual’s behavior 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Otherwise, another way to deal with infor-
mation asymmetry is through signals. Individuals use signals to resolve 
information asymmetries about latent and unobservable quality.
According to signaling theory, the lenders and borrowers have access 
to different information because while it is right lenders do not recei-
ve any interest in lending their money, they can lose their money if 
the borrowers do not return what they lent even when the repayment 
rate is high (96.7% according to Kiva). The use of signals is an exce-
llent way to amend this asymmetry. In this sense, the lenders have to 
look for signs to make sure they do not lose their money since losing 
their money takes away the possibility that another or others can also 
be financed later and might lose an opportunity to improve their li-
ves. Thus, the partner shows a good or reliable characteristic is taken 
as a good signal for the lenders and thus generates a positive way to 
impact the loans’ funding process. The signaling theory in the studies 
about crowdfunding is essential; this theory has been fundamental 
in combatting information asymmetry in investment decisions (e.g., 
Ahlers et al., 2015). 
Moleskis et al. (2018) studied how the factors influencing the like-
lihood of funding success vary for projects (humanitarian or entre-
preneurial projects). Also, there are studies of this theme, specifically 
about Kiva. Vismara (2018) proposed a taxonomy of signals that mat-
ches the senders—namely, such organizations as firms and nongover-
nmental organizations and individuals, including both proponents 
and fellow crowd-funders—and receivers, like backers, lenders, and 
investors to overcome inefficiencies in Crowdfunding Markets.  
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2.2 Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is a type of crowdsourcing where customers play as 
investors (Zheng et al., 2014). Crowdfunding is an effective funding 
channel to get small to medium-size investments from the crowd 
(Ordanini, 2009). Schwienbacher and Larralde (2012) identify three 
crowdfunding business models: donation, passive investment, and 
active investment. The first crowdfunding business model is that the 
donation model is more popular and implemented by non-govern-
mental organizations. The second crowdfunding business model is 
a passive investment. The crowdfunding sponsors have limited inte-
raction and communications with entrepreneurs but still aim to get 
rewards, tailored products, honorary recognitions, or other revenue 
sharing forms from the crowdfunding projects. Finally, the active in-
vestment provides crowdfunding sponsors the opportunities to invest 
money and continually interact with entrepreneurs, such as helping 
entrepreneurs with new features, testing products, and providing di-
rections and feedback (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012). Accor-
ding to this concept, Kiva belongs at the first crowdfunding model: 
donations because the lenders or investors do not receive financial 
rewards and the partners, which can be microfinance institutions 
(MFIs), social enterprises, and nonprofits organizations, only have 
limited interaction and communication with the borrower or bo-
rrowers that request the credit, they administer the loan, they post 
the loans on Kiva platform and make the risk rating of the loan. In 
the case of Kickstarter, it belongs to the second crowdfunding mo-
del: passive investment because the investors receive some form of 
rewards; these rewards can take different forms; however, they do not 
receive the control of the project, or they are not being used as active 
consumers. The kind of crowdfunding platforms that receive some 
form of reward let us call them “profit.”
In the studies about crowdfunding platforms, an important conclusion 
is that a project’s popularity positively affects its financing since it is 
a “rational” decision of the backers to support such projects to redu-
ce their own risk (Zhang and Liu, 2012).  However, these studies have 
been carried out using profit platforms such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, 
and Gofundme, but its objective and dynamic are different in Kiva’s 
case. In line with the concepts presented before, this study proposes the 
first hypothesis that in the kiva crowdfunding platform, unlike other 
crowdfunding platforms that are profit, lenders take variable popularity 
as a sign that there is no need urgently to be financed. Kickstarter states 
that “longer durations incite less urgency, encourage procrastination, 
and tend to fizzle out” (Harrison, 2017). Since they perceive that they 
have just been published on the platform and, therefore, still have time 
to raise funds, unlike those already going to expire.
H1: “The logarithm of popularity, as the signaling of the urgent need 
perceived by the lender, has a negative relationship with the percentage 
of loans borrowed by informal firms.”
2.3 Digital transformation and cooperation between informal and 
formal firms
In the digital transformation context, established companies re-
act to maintain their competitive advantage in digital disruption 
environments (Weill & Woerner, 2018). Digital platforms are not 
alien to this process because they need to develop strategic dimen-
sions as the network effect and platform identity (Cennamo, 2019). 
Moreover, in the digital platforms as Kiva and Go-Jek multi-service 
platform gives access to small informal entrepreneurs sell their pro-
ducts through this mobile APP, allowing small entrepreneurs to in-
crease the possibility of access to more customers. It generates a rela-
tionship of cooperation between informal and formal firms.  
Studies about the cooperation between informal and formal firms are 
less common than investigations of the competition between informal 
and formal firms. In the specific case of innovation, Bönte & Keilbach 
(2005) found weak empirical evidence for incoming knowledge spi-
llovers’ relevance for formal and informal cooperation. However, the 
firm’s ability to protect its proprietary innovations has a positive effect 
on a firm’s propensity to engage in formal and informal cooperation 
at the same time. Other research proposes that the high complexity of 
knowledge-intensive work, such as software development, makes it be-
neficial to have formal and informal articulation work (Boden et al., 
2014). Other studies have shown that formal firms use informal plat-
form companies as part of their production process, generating tem-
porary jobs offered in the so-called gig economy (Duggan et al., 2019).
The level of cooperation between formal and informal firms can increa-
se the legitimate to the informal firm activity. The informal firm can 
then access more formal financial activities (Frydrych et al., 2014); due 
to the information’s asymmetry, the lenders must see signals to invest. 
A way to get signals is seeing a good signal from the partner, and that 
is where collaboration is generated; the partners lend their good signal 
to benefit the borrowers to get more funds. Since they have more loans, 
the parties benefit more from getting more clients. Even if it is of lower 
profitability than their standard portfolio but has benefits for having 
more loans placed instead of idle money, they have a better reputation 
and benefit from social responsibility and popularity. However, it runs 
the risk that the lenders do not receive all the necessary funds and have 
already deposited the borrower, and that the borrower does not pay 
him. However, that risk is low (3.2%, according to Kiva). In Kiva, we 
can see the same phenomenon. Thus, we hypothesize as follows:
H2: “A good characteristic of the partner expressed by a good portfolio 
yield (formal firm) reduces the negative relation between Logarithm of 
popularity, as the signaling the level of an urgent need perceived by the 
lender, on percentage funded of the informal firm.” 
2.4 Tertiary sector
In Kiva’s case, the loans destined for the tertiary sector are used to fi-
nance entrepreneurial projects that are not of the humanitarian type. 
Therefore, if the lenders do not see a signal from the partner and see 
that the credit is more for business services or businesses, they do not 
see any sign that the probability of losing money decreases, and that 
goes for a project that can be said not very social. Besides, the service 
sector offers a not differentiated product with a low technology level 
and is more prone to get more informal firms (Heredia et al., 2019). 
It increases the risk of financing this type of entrepreneurship as a 
restaurant service and reduces the lenders’ propensity to invest. That 
is why we propose the following hypothesis:
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H3: “The characteristic of the loan the project as the tertiary sector, stren-
gthens the negative relation between Logarithm of popularity, as the signa-
ling the level of an urgent need perceived by the lender, and the percentage 
funded of the informal firm.” 
Figure 1: Proposed model. 
3. Methodology and data
A multivariate analysis using the ordinary least squares (OLS) tech-
nique is designed to test the proposed model’s hypothesis. It inclu-
des three models considering the model fit requirements (Heredia et 
al.,2019). The dependent variable is the “percentage financed of loans,” 
and the independent variables are obtained from related literature. 
Table 1 shows a description, explanations, and literature source of 
each variable included in the models. Model 1 includes de Logarithm 
of popularity and the independent variables as control variables. Mo-
del 2, in addition to Model 1, adds the “partner portfolio yield” and its 
moderation effect: “Logarithm popularity x partner portfolio yield.” 
Model 3 analyzes the effect of moderation of “tertiary,” including “Lo-
garithm popularity x tertiary.”
Table 1: Variable definitions
Variables   Expected sign β   Obs.   Mean   S.D.   Min   Max
Percent funded of loans (1) 2079 16.09 20.53 0 97.42
The Logarithm of popularity (2) (-) 2079 7.19 1.05 0.69 8.25
Partner portfolio yield (3) (+) 2003 3.57 0.35 1.91 4.12
Tertiary (4) (+) 2079 0.34 0.47 0 1
The number of loans posted currently by the partner (5) (-) 2070 156.7 129.7 0 385
Average loan size percent per capita income of the partner (6) (-) 2070 53.52 57.95 0 211.2
Repayment term (7) (-) 2027 16.94 6.71 6 62
Asia (8) (-) /(+) 2079 0.29 0.45 0 1
Lars Ratio (9) (-) 2079 4.91 40.15 0.03 1474
Time left (days) (10) (-) 2079 2.51 7.77 0.04 29.98
Fundraising rate per hour (11) (+) 2079 1.51 4.81 0 86.71
Partner default rate (12) (-) 2079 1.02 1.66 0 8.62
Logarithm partner amount raised (13) (+) 2070 16.00 1.03 11.70 18.06
The Logarithm of the amount posted (14) (-) 2070 16.00 1.03 11.70 18.06
Central America (15) (-) /(+) 2079 0.11 0.31 0 1
Female (16) (+) 2079 0.59 0.49 0 1
The profitability of the partner (17) (+) 2070 2.01 4.78 -26.4 65.82
Repayment monthly (18) (-) 2027 0.86 0.33 0 1
South America (19)   (-) /(+)   2079   0.06   0.24   0   1
(1) The percentage that the loan managed to be financed (Frydrych et al., 2014).
(2) Natural Logarithm of the number of visits that the loan profile has on the Kiva platform (Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2013).
(3) Performance of the partner’s portfolio (Moleskis et al., 2018).
(4) Dummy variable: (1) if the purpose of the loan is to produce services, (0) the purpose of the loan is not for services (Moleskis et al., 2018).
(5) The number of current credits the partner supported on Kiva (Frydrych et al., 2014).
(6) This ratio is useful to measure the partner’s performance (Frydrych et al., 2014).
(7) It is the number of loan repayment periods (Ly & Mason, 2012).
(8) Dummy variable: (1) if the person requesting the loan belongs to a country in the Asian continent; (0) if otherwise (Ly & Mason, 2012).
(9) It is the average hourly financing needed for a fully funded loan (Moleskis et al., 2018).
(10) It is the number of days left before it leaves the platform (Ly & Mason, 2012).
(11) The amount of money the loan gets per hour (Frydrych et al., 2014).
(12) Default rate = amount of ended loans defaulted / amount of ended loans (Frydrych et al., 2014).
(13) It is the Natural Logarithm of the amount of money that the partner has managed to invest until that moment (Moleskis et al., 2018).
(14) The natural logarithm of the amount of money that the partner is currently supporting on the platform (Moleskis et al., 2018).
(15) Dummy variable: (1) if the person requesting the loan belongs to a country of Central America; (0) if otherwise (Ly & Mason, 2012).
(16) Dummy variable: (1) the request of loan is female; (0), if otherwise (Ly & Mason, 2012).
(17) It is the partners’ current profitability that they obtain for supporting loans (Ly & Mason, 2012).
(18) Dummy variable: (1) if the loan has as repayment schedule months; (0), if otherwise (Ly & Mason, 2012).
(19) Dummy variable: (1) if the person requesting the loan belongs to a country of South America; (0), if otherwise (Ly & Mason, 2012).
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3.1 Data
The data were obtained from the Kiva crowdfunding platform on 
November 6, 2019. It corresponds to 2,080 observations with infor-
mation on the loans, borrowers’ characteristics, and partners. Formal 
businesses are mostly partnering like microfinance services. Also, 
there are schools and social organizations. All these organizations 
share the desire to improve people’s lives through safe, fair access to 
credit. The informal firms are the borrowers that, in general, cannot 
access the financial system, or it is costly for them.  
4. Results and discussion
The study is focused on analyzing the effects of the collaboration bet-
ween informal and formal firms on the percentage that Kiva’s loans 
are funded. In this line, the first result indicates that the “Logarithm 
of popularity” is significantly correlated negatively with the “percent 
funded of loans.” Also, there are significant correlations between “per-
cent funded” and other control variables the “number of loans posted 
currently by the partner,” “average loan size percent,” “per capita in-
come of the partner,” “repayment term,” “Asia,” “partner delinquency 
rate,” “Lars ratio,” “the number of days left until expiration,” “fundrai-
sing rate per hour,” “partner default rate,” “Logarithm of the amount 
posted,” “Central America,” “female,” “the profitability of the partner,” 
“repayment monthly,” and “South America country.” 
The Logarithm of popularity is considered a proxy variable of the 
number of lenders due to limited available data. Figure 2 shows the 
direct relationship between the time left for the credit profile to leave 
the Kiva platform and popularity. It shows that with more time left in 
Kiva, the organization will get less financing percentage of its credit 
since the lenders do not see it as urgent to finance the loans that just 
or have little time on the platform. 
Figure 2: Graphic analysis of popularity and time in Kiva. 
The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) are shown in Table 2. 
Model 1 states that the independent variable Logarithm of popularity 
has a significant effect on percent funded of loans, providing support 
for H1. This finding indicates that the percent funded can be higher 
by having less popularity from the lenders. It can be explained becau-
se the lenders can see that a loan profile is prevalent or has many vi-
sits; they will see it as a sign of no need for urgency to choose another. 
Model 2 and Model 3 confirm this result.
The results of Model 2 indicate that the partner’s excellent characte-
ristic expressed by a good portfolio yield moderates the relationship 
between the Logarithm of popularity and percent funded, providing 
support for H2. This finding shows that good portfolio yield signifi-
cantly affects the role of the Logarithm of popularity as a good signal 
perceived by lenders to finance loans. When the partner has a good 
portfolio yield, the negative relationship between the Logarithm of 
popularity and percent funded is weakened. Similarly, it is founded 
that the negative relationship between the Logarithm of popularity 
and percent financed is strengthened when the loan belongs to the 
tertiary or service sectors. This result supports the H3.
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Table 2: Regression results 
Variables
  DV: Percent funded of loans













Logarithm popularity x tertiary
-3.525***
    (0.667)
Number of loans posted currently by the partner
-0.036*** -0.032*** -0.036***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)





















Logarithm partner amount raised
2.773*** 2.459*** 2.773***
(0.389) (0.383) (0.389)














  (-6.647)   (-6.601)   (-6.647)
Significant at 10% *, Significant at 5%**, Significant at 1%***
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The results show that when the partner gives a good signal, the negati-
ve relationship between the Logarithm of popularity and the percen-
tage of loan financing in Kiva is weaker — generating collaboration 
between the formal and informal. It means a moderating role of part-
ner portfolio yield (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Moderating role of partner portfolio yield
In contrast, there is a moderating role of tertiary (if the organization 
belongs to the tertiary sector). Figure 4 shows that if the loan is aimed 
at the tertiary or services sector, it will strengthen the relationship’s 
negative effect.
Figure 4: Moderating role of tertiary.
5. Conclusion and implications
The analysis and results allow us to conclude that the hypothesis of 
the proposed model is confirmed. This means that the logarithm of 
popularity, as the signaling of the lender’s urgent need, negatively 
relates to the percentage of loans borrowed by informal firms. The 
logarithm of popularity must be understood as a proxy variable of the 
characteristics of the lenders. 
Additionally, a good characteristic of the partner expressed by a good 
portfolio yield (formal firm) reduces the negative relation (modera-
te) between Logarithm of popularity, as the signaling the level of the 
urgent need perceived by the lender, on percentage funded of the in-
formal firm (H2), and the characteristic of the loan the project as the 
tertiary sector, strengthens the negative relation (moderate) between 
Logarithm of popularity, as the signaling the level the urgent need 
perceived by the lender, and the percentage funded of the informal 
firm (H3). 
The study’s fi ndings pr ovide ne w insights into understanding ho w 
the conclusions of many studies on crowdfunding obtained so far 
may change depending on what type of crowdfunding is analyzed. 
The results are different from Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and other profit 
platforms, which conclude that more popularity of a project translates 
into a greater financing probability because the sponsors reduce their 
financing risk (Zhang and Liu, 2012). 
The collaboration between informal and formal firms can be genera-
ted on a digital platform and how this benefits the percentage of loan 
financing in Kiva. Th e study wi ll extend th ese previous th eories of  
the study of the interaction between formal and informal enterpri-
ses to the context of emerging economies to develop more insight, 
which allows us to understand these companies’ behavior (formal and 
informal) in industries that suffer or have high potential disruption. 
Recent studies on the interaction of formal and informal firms in 
emerging economies (Heredia et al., 2018; Heredia et al., 2019). 
The main limitation of the study is access to the data. It analyzed only 
a sample of loans from the Kiva.org microcredit platform. Another 
limitation is that the research was conducted only on this platform. 
Although the number of loans taken as the sample was comparati-
vely large, there can be some bias due to the Kiva platform’s unique 
features (Kiva Teams and Field Partners). It would be interesting to 
analyze the effects of a time horizon. Additionally, future research 
may perform the analysis by sector, industry, considering the lender’s 
information. 
6. References
Ahlers, G. K., Cumming, D., Günther, C., & Schweizer, D. (2015). Sig-
naling in equity crowdfunding. Entrepreneurship theory and practi-
ce, 39(4), 955-980. https://doi.org/10.1111/etap.12157
Boden, A., Rosswog, F., Stevens, G., & Wulf, V. (2014). Articula-
tion spaces: bridging the gap between formal and informal coor-
dination. Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Compu-
ter Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing. https://
doi:10.1145/2531602.2531621
Bönte, W., & Keilbach, M. (2004). Concubinage or Marriage? Infor-
mal and Formal Cooperations for Innovation. SSRN Electronic Jour-
nal. https://doi:10.2139/ssrn.546102
Cennamo, C. (2019). Competing in Digital Markets: A Platform-
Based Perspective. Academy of Management Perspectives. https://
doi:10.5465/amp.2016.0048
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). 
Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Manage-
ment, 37(1), 39-67. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310388419
Diamond, W. D., & Kashyap, R. K. (1997). Extending Models of 
Prosocial Behavior to Explain University Alumni Contributions 
1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27(10), 915-928. https://
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.1997.tb00278.x
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2020. Volume 15, Issue 4
61
Duggan, J., Sherman, U., Carbery, R., & McDonnell, A. (2019). App-
Work, Algorithmic Management & HRM in the Emerging Gig Eco-
nomy: A Research Agenda. Academy of Management Proceedings, 
2019(1), 15773. https://doi:10.5465/ambpp.2019.15773abstract
Frydrych, D., Bock, A. J., Kinder, T., & Koeck, B. (2014). Exploring En-
trepreneurial Legitimacy in Reward-Based Crowdfunding. Venture Ca-
pital, 16(3), 247–269. https://doi:10.1080/13691066.2014.916512
Funk, A. S. (2019). Crowdfunding in China. Crowdfunding in China, 
149–198. https://doi:10.1007/978-3-319-97253-4_5
Harrison, R. T. (2017). Crowdfunding and Entrepreneurial Finance. 
Routledge https://doi:10.4324/9781315682440
Heredia Pérez, J. A., Kunc, M. H., Durst, S., Flores, A., & Geldes, C. 
(2018). Impact of Competition from Unregistered Firms On R&D In-
vestment by Industrial Sectors in Emerging Economies. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 133, 179–189. https://doi:10.1016/j.
techfore.2018.03.028
Heredia Pérez, J. A. H., Yang, X., Bai, O., Flores, A., & Heredia, W. H. 
(2019). How Does Competition by Informal Firms affect the Innova-
tion in Formal Firms? International Studies of Management & Orga-
nization, 49(2), 173–190. https://doi:10.1080/00208825.2019.1608402
Heredia, J., Heredia, W., & Flores, A. (2020). The Role of Information 
Technology to Build Capabilities in Inclusive Businesses: A Case Stu-
dy in China and Peru’s Cosmetic Industry. Academy of Management 
Global Proceedings (2020), 200.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Ma-
nagerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi:10.1016/0304-
405x(76)90026-x
Kuppuswamy, V., & Bayus, B. L. (2013). Crowdfunding Creative 
Ideas: The Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter. SSRN Electro-
nic Journal. https://doi:10.2139/ssrn.2234765
Ly, P., & Mason, G. (2012). Individual preferences over development 
projects: Evidence from microlending on Kiva. Voluntas: Internatio-
nal Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 23(4), 1036-
1055. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11266-011-9255-8
Moleskis, M., Alegre, I., & Canela, M. A. (2018). Crowdfunding En-
trepreneurial or Humanitarian Needs? The Influence of Signals and 
Biases on Decisions. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 48(3), 
552–571. https://doi:10.1177/0899764018802367
Monteiro F. L., Rozman G., Carrick A. M. (2018). Digital Transforma-
tion in Latin America: A Leapfrogging Opportunity? Harvard Busi-
ness Publishing Education, 1-56.
Ordanini, A. (2009). Crowdfunding: customers as investors. The Wall 
Street Journal, 23(3), 5-7.
Schlegelmilch, B. B., Love, A., & Diamantopoulos, A. (1997). Responses 
to different charity appeals: the impact of donor characteristics on the 
amount of donations. European Journal of Marketing, 31(8), 548–560. 
https://doi:10.1108/03090569710176574
Schwienbacher, A., & Larralde, B. (2012). Alternative types of entrepre-
neurial finance. In The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance. 
http://doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195391244.013.0013
Schwittay, A. (2019). Digital Mediations of Everyday Humanitarianism: 
The Case of Kiva.Org. Third World Quarterly, 40(10), 1921–1938. 
https://doi:10.1080/01436597.2019.1625267
Shier, M. L., & Handy, F. (2012). Understanding online donor beha-
vior: the role of donor characteristics, perceptions of the internet, we-
bsite and program, and influence from social networks. International 
Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 17(3), 219–230. 
https://doi:10.1002/nvsm.1425
Tate, W. L., Bals, L., & Marshall, D. (2019). Supply Chain Management 
at The Base of the Pyramid. International Journal of Physical Distri-
bution & Logistics Management, 49(5), 438–450. https://doi:10.1108/
ijpdlm-06-2019-390
Vismara, S. (2018). Signaling to Overcome Inefficiencies in Crowdfun-
ding Markets. The Economics of Crowdfunding, 29–56. https://
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66119-3_3
Vismara, S. (2018). Information cascades among investors in equity 
crowdfunding. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 42(3), 467-497. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/etap.12261
Weill, P., & Woerner, S. L. (2018). Is your company ready for a digital 
future? MIT Sloan Management Review, 59(2), 21-25.
Zhang, J. J., and Liu, P. (2012). Rational Herding in Microloan Mar-
kets. Management Science, 58(5), 892-912. https://doi.org/10.1287/
Mnsc.1110.1459
Zheng, H., Li, D., Wu, J., & Xu, Y. (2014). The role of multidimen-
sional social capital in crowdfunding: A comparative study in Chi-
na and US. Information & Management, 51(4), 488–496. https://
doi:10.1016/j.im.2014.03.003
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2020. Volume 15, Issue 4
62
